DaysofPal – Two years after the outbreak of the Gaza war, which expanded into multiple regional arenas, Israel’s claims of “changing the Middle East” in its favor have largely dissipated. Despite the unprecedented scale of Israeli military operations, from Gaza to Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, the conflict’s outcomes reveal limited local military gains rather than a decisive strategic shift in regional power. Instead, the war exposed profound political and regional setbacks for Tel Aviv.
This assessment comes from a study published by the Al Jazeera Center for Studies on December 8, which concluded that Israel, while attempting to use the war as a gateway to regional dominance and to expand Arab normalization, ended up losing opportunities for rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, prompting a resurgence of Syria’s regional positioning, and entering an accelerated confrontational trajectory with Turkey, all without neutralizing its main adversaries.
Strategic Context Before the War
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu first articulated the concept of “changing the Middle East” following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023, presenting the war as an opportunity to redraw regional power maps.
As his far-right government engaged in a campaign of destruction in Gaza and extended operations to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iran, Israel appeared to pursue a strategy beyond conventional military retaliation, a project aimed at reshaping its strategic environment.
Yet, the expansion of military operations did not translate into lasting strategic transformation. Wars, however intense, are measured not only by battlefield outcomes but also by their ability to produce sustainable political gains, a metric in which Israel failed.
Prior to October 7, 2023, the Arab-Islamic Middle East was marked by a fragile balance, maintained not through stability but by managing contradictions. Four main regional powers, Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, shared influence, each wielding different tools of power while observing unspoken limits to avoid full-scale confrontation.
Israel enjoyed qualitative military superiority and unconditional Western backing, yet it remained regionally isolated and faced a historical legitimacy crisis. Iran expanded its influence via a network of non-state allies, leveraging deep gaps in Arab politics, but was constrained by sanctions and economic limitations.
Turkey had built a multi-faceted model of power combining economy, military industry, and cultural influence, extending its political and military reach without direct clashes with major powers. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, repositioned itself regionally, pursuing de-escalation, seeking practical agreements, and avoiding costly wars while retaining political and religious weight.
This balance was not one of peace but of mutual deterrence, reliant on avoiding red lines. The Gaza war disrupted this equilibrium, testing each power’s ability to withstand shocks and reposition itself.
Gaza: The Strategic Shock
The October 7 attack by Palestinian resistance forces struck a severe blow to Israel’s security doctrine, exposing vulnerabilities in its famed deterrence system. The incident was more than a security failure; it was a political and psychological shock that rattled Israeli society and leadership, prompting an excessively violent response, according to the study.
The most serious impact was not casualties, but the exposure of institutional incapacity to respond to a coordinated attack by a besieged force in a confined geographic area. This breach deeply eroded Israeli public trust in military and political institutions, driving leadership, including Netanyahu, to overreact in an attempt to restore deterrence, even at the expense of international law or regional stability.
Consequently, the war evolved in Israeli discourse from a military response to an existential project, with objectives expanding beyond Gaza to include all perceived elements of the “threat axis.” However, the excessive response instead embroiled Israel in overlapping conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iran, revealing the limits of military power without a clear political horizon and deepening Israel’s political isolation rather than restoring deterrence.
Gaza remained the focal point, demonstrating Israel’s failure to convert military force into a strategic victory. From the outset, Israel pursued total destruction, targeting infrastructure, civil institutions, and social networks supporting the resistance in an attempt to break collective will.
Despite unprecedented destruction, the campaign did not produce the decisive outcome Tel Aviv sought. Hamas, though suffering heavy losses, remained a functioning military and political force, able to reorganize. The broader project of displacement, whether explicit or implicit, also failed, leaving Palestinians in Gaza as a persistent obstacle to Israeli strategic objectives.
Lebanon and Yemen: Weakening Without Resolution
In Lebanon, the war’s outcomes were complex. While Israel inflicted significant blows on Hezbollah, assassinating leaders and destroying infrastructure, it did not dismantle the organization or its social and political foundations. Lebanon’s delicate sectarian system prevents any forceful disarmament of Hezbollah without risking civil conflict. Israel’s operations south of the Litani River caused temporary tactical gains but did not produce lasting strategic assurances.
In Yemen, Israeli strikes failed to deter the Houthis, who emerged with enhanced symbolic and regional standing, controlling maritime movement through the Bab al-Mandab and gaining legitimacy in Arab and Islamic public opinion.
Syria: An Open Front
The fall of Assad’s regime presented Israel with a rare opportunity to reorganize its northern front without direct military cost. Instead, Israel pursued a path of raw force, conducting repeated incursions and targeting Syria’s new military infrastructure, preventing Syria from stabilizing. This approach transformed Syria from a neutralizable state into a renewed flashpoint, forcing Damascus to view Israel as a direct threat and opening potential indirect conflict with Turkey.
Iran: Tactical Loss, Strategic Immunity
The confrontation with Iran highlighted the limits of military resolution. Israeli attacks on nuclear sites, with U.S. support, caused significant damage but did not halt Iran’s nuclear program or erase its accumulated technical knowledge.
Iran, on the other hand, became more conscious of its weaknesses and determined to reestablish its deterrence as it expedited reconstruction and strengthened ties with China and Russia. Strategically, Israel failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat, and the conflict became a long-term, cyclical struggle rather than a decisive resolution.
Saudi Arabia: Normalization Deferred
Saudi Arabia entered the Gaza war carefully balancing regional pressures, internal stability, and U.S. strategic ties. Before October 7, Riyadh was considered the key prize in the Israeli–American normalization project. The war, however, reshaped the calculus: the humanitarian catastrophe and regional backlash made any normalization politically and ethically untenable. Saudi Arabia reinforced its long-standing principle: no normalization without a genuine political path to a Palestinian state—a condition rendered non-negotiable in the post-war context.
Turkey: From Tension to Rivalry
Turkey emerged as an unexpected variable. Previously, intermittent tensions had not crossed the threshold into open confrontation. The war, however, propelled Turkey into active support for Palestinians, hosting Hamas leaders and mobilizing public opinion against Israel. For the first time, Israeli think tanks identified Turkey as a potential strategic adversary. Turkey, viewing Israel’s actions in Syria as a direct threat to its national security, now anticipates potential confrontation with Tel Aviv.
Overall, the war revealed Israel’s inability to convert military power into lasting political gains. It failed to eliminate Palestinian resistance, neutralize Hezbollah, or weaken Iran, while losing the opportunity for Saudi normalization, rearming Syria, and provoking Turkey into opposition. Instead of expanding its alliances, Israel’s actions prompted major regional powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, to reposition themselves in ways that constrain Tel Aviv’s ambitions.
In short, the Gaza war did not “change the Middle East,” as Netanyahu had promised. Rather, it reproduced a more hostile regional environment, politically less amenable to Israel, and left the country facing an open-ended strategic challenge that remains unresolved.
Shortlink for this post: https://daysofpalestine.ps/?p=70725
